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Empathy and Compassion
Richard Warner∗
Can  we  know  what  another  is  feeling?  Ask  a  non-
philosopher  (and  many  a  philosopher),  and,  if  your 
audience  deigns  to  produce  more  than  a  pained 
expression, the answer will  be an impatient affirmation. 
That—minus the impatience—is my answer too. Genuinely 
questioning whether we can know what others think and 
feel is a sign of insanity. Nonetheless, I contend that we 
often think we know what another thinks and feels when 
in fact we do not. Knowing how another thinks and feels 
can  be,  and  often  is,  a  difficult  achievement  and  our 
efforts  in  this  regard  are  often  at  best  only  partially 
successful. Others are far more opaque to us than we may 
suppose.
I approach this issue via the philosophical problem of 
“other minds.”1 The version of the problem relevant here 
is  posed  by  presenting  a  seemingly  valid  argument 
leading to the conclusion that we do not know that others 
feel and experience as we do. The point is not to convince 
anyone  of  a  conclusion  only  an  insane  person  would 
believe.  The  point  is  to  demonstrate  that  we  lack  an 
adequate theoretical explanation of how we know about 
the  mental  life  of  others.  My  primary  interest  in  this 
argument is two-fold. First, I present it to avoid confusion 
by explicitly setting it aside as it is not the focus of my 
concern. Second, I will use the style of argument, if not 
the content, as a model for the two arguments that are 
my central concern. The first of these arguments assumes 
that  we  can  know  about  the  mental  life  of  others  but 
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1
1
. There  are  two “other  minds”  problems.  The  classic  problem 
argues that I  do not know, and can never  know, that others  have a 
mental  life at all;  they might, for all  I  know be robots devoid of any 
mental  activity.  The  other  “other  minds”  problem I  discuss assumes 
others have a mental life but argues that we cannot know about their 
feelings.
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argues that we often do not because of the possibility that 
they are deceiving us.  The second assumes that others 
are on the whole truthful and argues that we still  often 
lack the background knowledge necessary to know about 
important aspects of their mental lives.
It  is  essential  to  be  clear  about  one  point  at  the 
outset. A remark by former Canadian Prime Minister Kim 
Campbell illustrates the issue. In an attempt to empathize 
with residents at a shelter in Vancouver’s Skid Row, she 
told them that she too had felt loss and disappointment; 
she  had  once,  she  explained,  wanted  to  be  a  concert 
cellist. The Prime Minister’s remark seems silly. But why? 
She and the residents had felt disappointed, so, in that 
sense, she had vicariously experienced what they felt. The 
remark is silly because she claimed to know more than 
just that they both had felt disappointed. She claimed to 
know  that  her  experience  of  disappointment  at  not 
becoming a concert cellist was qualitatively the same (or 
very closely similar  to)  the residents’  felt  experience of 
disappoint-ment. This seems silly to the extent that one 
imagines the residents’ sense of loss and disappointment 
having  a  depth,  extent,  and  intensity  unknown  in  the 
Prime Minister’s experience. The most the Prime Minister 
could know was that  the residents’  felt  experience was 
enough like hers that both count as disappointments; but, 
claiming to have vicariously experienced their feeling is a 
bit like claiming to know what a shark looks like when gold 
fish are all that one has ever seen. The Prime Minister’s 
feelings belong to the same genus, so to speak, but not to 
the same species.2 The point I wish to emphasize is that I 
am concerned with our ability to know the “species.”
Empathy can give us such knowledge. The dictionary 
defines empathy as “understanding, being aware of, being 
sensitive  to,  and  vicariously  experiencing  the  feelings, 
thoughts,  and  experience  of  another.”3 “Vicarious 
2
2
. For an even more egregious example, imagine this response to 
someone who has expressed to her friend her feelings of frustration, 
weariness,  isolation,  and  exasperation  at  raising  a  toddler.  The 
response: “I understand just how you feel. Having a dog is even more 
demanding  than  having  a  kid.”  Having  a  dog  can  make  one  feel 
frustration, weariness, isolation, and exasperation, but, until  you care 
for a toddler, you really do not know what it can feel like. Again, the 
friend’s feelings belong to the same genus, but not to the same species.
3
3
. Merriam  Webster  Online,  http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/empathy (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
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experience”  need  not,  but  certainly  can,  reveal  the 
“species.” In this way, empathy can take us beyond just 
knowing  that  our  feelings  and  the  feelings  of  others 
belong to the same general category; it uses our feelings 
to  paint  a  portrait  of  another’s  feelings  in  a  way  that 
allows us to know the specific felt quality of the other’s 
experience. We in turn want others to know the specific 
felt qualities of our experiences. Such knowledge is one 
basis of intimacy between friends, lovers, and spouses. I 
contend,  however,  that  we  have  such  knowledge  less 
often  than  we  think,  and  I  argue  that  this  fact  should 
make us more tolerant of others than we are.
I. THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS
The argument proceeds by describing a possibility and 
then claiming that it poses an unanswerable challenge to 
our knowledge claims. The possibility: imagine that there 
was a nuclear  holocaust in 1957 which created enough 
worldwide  radiation  that  the  entire  human  population 
eventually  perished.  Before  the  last  survivors  died, 
however, an advanced race of benevolent aliens secretly 
landed  on  earth.  The  aliens,  conveniently  immune  to 
radiation,  surreptitiously  harvested  eggs  from  the  last 
survivors, used sperm banks to fertilize them, and buried 
the  frozen  eggs  deep  in  Montana.  In  1975,  the  aliens 
unthawed  one  egg  as  a  test.  You  are  the  result. 
Unfortunately,  radiation  levels  were  still  so  high  that 
managing  your  growth  process  was  quite  difficult; 
consequently, the aliens decided to delay their next test 
until 2030. To avoid the devastating psychological impact 
of  your  discovering  that  you  are  the  only  non-alien  on 
earth, the aliens simply let you think they are all human 
beings too.  Their  deception  succeeds because they are 
the  product  of  an  evolution  that  precisely  parallels  our 
own. They are our cosmic twins. They look, act, and speak 
exactly  as  we  do;  they  have  their  own  Shakespeare, 
Keats, Einstein, and so on. They speak of hope, joy, pain, 
gratitude, and the like just as we do, and those feelings 
exhibit  the  same  causal  nexus  as  our  feelings.  What 
causes joy in them is the same as what causes joy in us, 
and the thoughts and actions joy causes in them are the 
same as it causes in us. The difference is that the feeling 
at the center of the causal  nexus is not the same. The 
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aliens’  neurophysiology  is  fundamentally  different,  with 
the result that their felt experience is very different from 
ours.4 When their Keats writes, “A thing of beauty is a joy 
forever,”  the  joy  he  refers  to  has  a  very  different  felt 
quality than the joy to which our Keats refers.
Possibilities  of  this  type  provide  a  seemingly 
unanswerable  challenge  to  our  claims  to  know  how 
another feels. Consider an example. Suppose that, when 
my grandmother dies, you think about me confronting her 
death;  and,  as  you  imagine  my  reactions,  you  feel  a 
wrenching sense of loss. You infer that I  feel the same. 
The alien invasion possibility seems to show that you do 
not  know that I feel the same. To see why, consider an 
analogy. As you are walking along a forest path, you see a 
footprint.  Two different  species  of  animal,  A’s  and  B’s, 
leave exactly that footprint, and it is equally likely that it 
was left by either (there are an equal number of A’s and 
B’s  in  the  forest).  Do  you  know,  on  the  basis  of  the 
footprint  alone,  which  animal  left  it?  Of  course  not.  To 
know it is an A, you have to rule out the possibility it is a 
B, and vice versa. You can do neither on the basis of the 
footprint alone.
The  wrenching  grief  example  looks  similar.  The 
“footprint”  consists  of  everything  you  have  observed 
throughout  your  lifetime.  This  evidence  cannot  decide 
between two hypotheses: I feel what you feel; or, I am an 
alien  with  utterly  different  felt  experiences.  For  all  you 
know, it is as likely that everyone else is an alien as it is 
that everyone else is a human being. It appears then to 
follow that you do not know that you and I are relevantly 
similar,  and hence that  you do not know whether what 
you feel is what I feel.
This is not to deny that you could know.5 You could cut 
open my brain to see if my neurophysiology is human or 
alien.  You  could  also  excavate  Montana,  discover  the 
4
4
. We could  know that  they  feel  differently  than we do without 
knowing what it was like to have their felt experiences. Neurophysiology 
could  tell  us  that  such-and-such  biochemical  activity  in  them  will 
produce  some felt  experience,  but  not  one  that  we  have  ever 
experienced.
5
5
. The example is in this way consistent with the Wittgensteinian 
demand that every mental state have an outward criterion. There are 
“criteria” by which I can know what the feelings of the aliens are; my 
problem is that I am not, and will  not be, in a position to know how 
those criteria are fulfilled.
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frozen eggs along with the alien’s records, and conclude 
that  I  am  an  alien.  But  you  have  done  none  of  these 
things nor anything similar. You rely on a thin thread of 
observable evidence to conclude that you and I are similar 
in regard to the feelings aroused in us by the death of a 
family member.
The conclusion to draw from this argument is not the 
insane one that we cannot know what others feel. No one 
in their  right mind denies that  the observable evidence 
that we do in fact have is in many cases sufficient for us 
to know that others feel as we do. The conclusion to draw 
is that being unable to rule out the alien twins possibility 
does not defeat your knowledge claim in the way “How do 
you know it is not animal B?” defeats your claim to know 
that the animal was an A. What explains this difference? 
The puzzle is to find an adequate answer.
The explanation I suggest is that we should not regard 
“Others are human beings similar to me in feeling” as a 
routine empirical hypotheses like “The animal in the forest 
is an A.” We should see it as an unshakable tenet of the 
conceptual  framework  within  which  we  formulate  and 
evaluate routine empirical hypotheses. It is unshakable in 
the  sense  that,  although  we  can  easily  describe 
possibilities  like  the  alien  twin  possibility,  we  cannot 
describe a scenario which makes us conclude, “Yes, now I 
really  do  see  that  this  possibility  is  something  I  must 
address  whenever  I  claim to  know how another  feels.” 
Instead, we just blithely continue to assume that others 
are similarly-feeling human beings. The crucial task is to 
explain the unshakability of the assumption in a way that 
reveals  why  we are  justified  in  thinking  it  true  without 
making  its  justification  a  matter  of  confirmation  by 
observable  evidence  in  the  same way  we  confirm that 
“The animal is an A.”
Without  a  solution  to  the “other minds”  puzzle,  we 
lack an adequate understanding of the ultimate basis of 
our knowledge that others feel as we do. The hope is not 
simply that the solution will remove a pesky puzzle; the 
hope is that the solution will yield a satisfying insight into 
just how it is that we can know that we feel alike.
II. THE DECEPTION ARGUMENT
The  “deception  argument”  concerns  possibilities  of 
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deceit  which  are  consistent  with  the  assumption  that 
others are similarly-feeling human beings yet still seem to 
show that  we cannot  know what  another feels.  I  begin 
with  three  examples  to  illustrate  the  kind  of  deceit  in 
question and also to suggest that it is common.
Love  Story:  Early  in  their  romance,  Derek  and 
Meredith are watching the movie,  Love Story. When the 
movie  ends,  Meredith  describes how moved she is  and 
how  she  feels,  and  Derek,  looking  into  her  eyes, 
deceitfully tells her he feels the same. He is certain that 
Meredith will believe him because he knows she assumes 
that they are relevantly similar in their felt responses to 
romantic-novel-like portrayals of emotional relationships.
Marital infidelity: After several years of marriage, both 
Derek and Meredith are having affairs.  Each of  them is 
unaware of the other’s infidelity, and, from time to time, 
Derek deceitfully confesses to Meredith his still-felt-after-
all-this-time  passion  for  her,  and  Meredith  deceitfully 
assures  him that  she  feels  the  same.  They  are  certain 
their  respective  deceptions  will  succeed  because  each 
assumes the other, not only still  feels passion, but also 
assumes that the feeling is mutual.
Negotiation:  Edwards and Gorski are negotiating the 
establishment of an IBM office in Krakow, Poland. To make 
the negotiations go smoothly,  Edwards has taken every 
opportunity  to  indicate  that,  across  a  wide  range  of 
business  and  social  matters,  she  and  Gorski  feel  the 
same. Edwards has not been concerned with whether her 
claims in this regard are true; she is willing to deceive to 
ensure that Gorski sees her as a person who feels as he 
does. Gorski notices their apparent agreement in feeling, 
and soon concludes that she feels as he does.
I  offer  a  “possibility  of  deception”  argument,  which 
parallels  the alien twin argument.  The argument is that 
the possibility of deception shows that, in many cases at 
least, we do not know that others feel as we do. To begin 
the  argument,  imagine  yourself  in  the  grandmother’s 
death/sense of loss example. You know me well; you have 
observed my behavior with great care after the death of 
my  grandmother.  You  believe  that,  if  you  have  ever 
known anything at all, you know that I feel a sense of loss 
similar to that which you feel. Even so, the possibility of 
deceit appears to defeat your knowledge claim. How, for 
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example, do you show that the following is not the case? I 
do  not  feel  a  sense  of  loss;  what  I  experience  is  the 
absence of any such feeling; however, I pretend to feel a 
sense of loss. Doing so is easier than explaining what is 
really going on with me; consequently, you are mistaken 
when you infer that I feel as you do on the basis of my 
behavior and the assumption that you and I are relevantly 
similar in our felt responses to death.6
The claim is not that it is impossible for you to rule out 
this possibility. You could, for example, hack into the diary 
that I keep on my computer and read my confession that I 
feel  nothing;  or,  you  could  use  hi-tech  surveillance 
equipment to eavesdrop on what I assume is the secret, 
Shakespearean-style soliloquy in which discuss out loud 
with myself my lack of grief. The point is that you have 
done nothing of the sort; you have just briefly observed 
my behavior. In such case, the totality of your evidence 
cannot decide between two hypotheses: that I really feel a 
sense of loss; or, that I am just pretending; hence it is as 
likely that I am pretending as it is that I feel a sense of 
loss. Thus, it appears to follow that you do not know that 
you and I are relevantly similar,  and hence that you do 
not know whether what you feel is what I feel. In general, 
when we think  others  feel  as  we do,  the  basis  for  our 
conviction  is  typically  a  slim  thread  of  observable 
evidence,  a  thread  consistent  with  those  who  simply 
pretend to feel what they seem to feel.
As before, we should not draw the insane conclusion 
that we do not know what others feel. We should conclude 
that being unable to rule out the possibility of deceit does 
not defeat your knowledge claim in the way “How do you 
know it is not animal B?” defeats your claim to know the 
animal was an A. The question again is: What explains this 
difference?  The  answer  cannot  be  the  same  as  the 
suggested  answer  in  the  “other  minds”  case.  The 
6
6
. Is your conclusion defensible on the ground that it is difficult to 
maintain a consistent false façade over any extended period of time 
and therefore even a relatively short period of observation is sufficient 
to  rule  out  pretense?  The  problem  is  that  it  is  simply  false  that 
consistent deceit is too difficult to maintain for an extended period of 
time.  Spies  and  undercover  agents  successfully  deceive  consistently 
over extended periods of time. The testimony of literature is the same. 
Two examples: Iago’s systematic deceit is the central theme of Othello; 
the  arch  manipulator  Julian  King  in  Iris  Murdoch’s  novel,  A  Fairly 
Honorable Defeat pretends with easy success throughout the novel.
RICHARD WARNER, "EMPATHY AND COMPASSION," 9(2) MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 813-826 (2008).
820 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 9:2
suggestion was to see “Others are human beings similar 
to me in feeling” as an unshakable tenet of the conceptual 
framework  within  which  we  formulate  and  evaluate 
routine empirical hypotheses. This will not do in the case 
of the second puzzle because it does not deny that others 
are  similar-feeling  human  beings.  The  puzzle  simply 
imagines  that  other  similarly-feeling  human  beings 
deceive  us.  Of  course,  the  answer  could  be—and  most 
likely  is—that  some  sort  of  assumption  of  non-
deceitfulness  is  itself  an  unshakable  tenet  of  our 
conceptual  framework.  We  all  do  indeed  assume some 
degree of relevant non-deceptiveness on the part of some 
smaller or larger circle of intimates, friends, and acquain-
tances. The question is how to justify such an assumption. 
“On the basis of experience” will not do since that simply 
assumes that in the past one was able to know that one 
was not deceived. What we want to know is precisely how 
one qualifies as knowing in the face of the possibility of 
deception.  A  satisfactory  answer  would  illuminate  the 
nature of our relation to others. I will not, however, pursue 
this question any further.
III. OVER-GENERALIZATION
The  final  argument  concerns  possibilities  which  are 
consistent with the assumption that others do not as a 
rule  deceive  us  but  which  still  seem  to  show  that  we 
cannot  know  that  others  feel  as  we  do.  This  time  the 
possibilities  involve  over-generalization.  When  we  infer 
that  others  feel  as  we  do,  our  inference  rests  on  the 
generalization that their feelings are similar to ours. When 
we  over-generalize,  we  think  we  know how others  feel 
when in fact we do not.
For  an example of  over-generalization,  imagine that 
the twenty-year-old Mason reads  Crime and Punishment 
for his Russian literature course; in his essay on the book, 
he  considers  the  standard  (and  correct)  claim  that, 
through Roskolnikov, Dostoyevsky intends to demonstrate 
that the notions of sin, guilt, confession, and redemption 
through  suffering  still  apply,  even  to  those  without 
religious  faith.  Mason  does  not  deny  that  this  was 
Dostoyevsky’s  intention,  but  he  argues  that,  once 
Roskolnikov confesses to the murder of the old woman, all 
Dostoyevsky  succeeds  in  portraying  is  a  broken  man 
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without  the  courage  of  his  convictions.  Mason  feels 
disdain  for  Roskolnikov  and  a  lack  of  respect  for 
Dostoyevsky.  When  Mason’s  father  mentions  that  he 
recently  reread  Crime and Punishment,  Mason assumes 
his father feels the same way. Mason is wrong. When his 
father read the novel in his twenties, his reactions were 
the same as his son’s, but, at fifty and no stranger to what 
he  would  be  willing  to  label  “sin”  and  “guilt,”  he  sees 
confessing Roskolnikov as having the courage to take a 
necessary  first  step  toward  redemption,  and  he  feels 
respect  for  both  Roskolnikov  and  Dostoyevsky.  Mason 
over-generalizes.  He  thinks  his  father  is  relevantly  like 
him, when he is not.
When we claim to know that another feels as we do, 
how do we know we are not over-generalizing? I am not 
claiming that we can  never know that we are not over-
generalizing. In the wrenching-sense-of-loss example, for 
instance,  you  may  know  me  well  enough  to  know  for 
certain that my grandmother’s death will make me feel as 
your  grandmother’s  death  would  make  you  feel.  My 
concern is with the cases where we know the other less 
well. Imagine, by way of illustration, a law professor trying 
to  help  an  academically  struggling  student.  When  the 
professor learns the student has been dismissed from law 
school  for  poor  academic  performance,  the  professor 
imagines  the  student  receiving  the  dismissal  letter. 
Imaginatively projecting himself into the student’s plight, 
the professor feels disappointment, chagrin, worry, and he 
infers the student feels the same. He makes the inference 
because he assumes the student’s real reactions will be 
relevantly similar  his  imagined ones. The assumption is 
reasonable.  Concerned about the student,  the professor 
perceives a pressing need to  come to  some conclusion 
about how the student will react. What resources does he 
have at his disposal to predict the student’s reaction? It is 
not  as  if  he  can  consult  the  Comprehensive  Manual  of 
Human  Felt  Reactions  Categorized  by  Personality  Type 
and  Circumstance,  and  he  may  never  have  seen  the 
student react in any similar situation before. All he has to 
fall  back on is trying to feel as the student will  feel.  In 
general,  we must,  for the most part,  see others as like 
ourselves in order to predict how they will feel, and, where 
the  need to  predict  is  sufficiently  pressing,  we are  not 
unreasonable  to  so.  Unfortunately,  the  unanimous 
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testimony of common experience, history, literature, and 
psychology is  that  people  tend to see others more like 
themselves  than  the  others  really  are;  consequently, 
when we think we are painting a portrait of how another 
feels, we may only be producing a picture of the bars of 
the cage of our own limited experience.
This is the professor’s fate. The student’s reaction is 
blind rage, which leads him to make a formal complaint of 
unfair  treatment  with  the  Dean  of  Students.  Such 
possibilities  of  over-generalization  would  seem to  show 
that a large number of cases we only think we know how 
others feel. Thus: suppose that, in the wrenching-sense-
of-loss example, you do  not know me that well;  I  am a 
distant  relative  you  have  just  met  at  the  funeral.  You 
watch me as I quietly stare into my grandmother’s open 
grave;  imagining  how  I  must  feel,  you  are  suddenly 
gripped by a wrenching sense of loss, and, assuming we 
are relevantly similar in our felt responses to death, you 
infer  that  I  must  be  feeling  the  same  way.  Given  the 
totality of your observable evidence, two hypotheses are 
equally likely: you are not over-generalizing and we are 
relevantly  similar;  or,  you are over-generalizing and we 
are  not  relevantly  similar.  Since  the  totality  of  your 
evidence leaves these hypotheses equally likely, you do 
not know that I feel what you feel. The argument applies 
whenever  the  totality  of  one’s  observable  evidence  is 
insufficient  to  decide  between  the  two  hypotheses  of 
accurate generalization versus over-generalization.
The answer to this argument is simply to accept it. 
The possibility of over-generalization  does show that we 
fail to know when the underlying generalization rests on 
insufficient  observable  evidence.  We—often–only  think 
that we know that others feel as we do. “Often” because, 
like the law professor concerned about the student,  we 
often perceive a need to predict how others will feel, and, 
often, all  we have to go on is our own felt reactions to 
imagined situations. We inevitably use them as the basis 
on which to predict how others will feel. Consequently, we 
often routinely adopt this strategy when have only slim 
evidence for the generalization that our felt reactions are 
the same as the reactions of others. We inevitably over-
generalize.
One might respond,  “So what?  I  predict how others 
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feel on the basis of what I would feel. When it works, it 
works. When it does not, I correct my assumptions. What 
does it  matter than I  do not  know as long as I  have a 
reasonable strategy to follow to predict how others feel?” 
The problem is  with  the “When it  works,  it  works.”  We 
may  not  know  when  it  “works.”  Mason,  and  the  law 
professor,  for  example,  may  never  know  whether  their 
prediction “worked” unless the others about whom they 
made their predictions reveal whether the prediction was 
accurate. Unless we communicate, we are very unlikely to 
learn whether our claims are right or wrong. Unless his 
father tells him, Mason may never learn that his view of 
his father is wrong; the same holds for the law professor, 
who  may  never  talk  to  the  dismissed-from-law-school 
student again. Where there is no communication, to say: 
“When it works, it works” is like shooting at a target you 
cannot see and saying, “When I hit it, I hit it, and when I 
miss, I adjust my aim.” Since you do not know when you 
hit it, you do not know when or how to adjust your aim. 
Knowing how another feels is the same: often we think we 
are painting a portrait of another’s feelings when we are 
really just producing yet one more rendition of the bars of 
our cage.
One may object that I am too strongly discounting the 
possibility  that  others  will  simply tell  us  how they feel. 
After all, Mason’s father might learn of his son’s mistaken 
belief  and might  correct  it  by  telling  him that  he  feels 
respect,  not  disdain,  for  Roskolnikov  and  Dostoyevsky. 
Mason can then revise his erroneous assumption that he 
and his father have similar felt responses. Similarly, the 
law  professor  could  seek  out  the  student,  and  the 
Canadian  Prime  Minister  could  ask  the  homeless  to 
describe  their  disappointment.  Even  if  attempting  to 
empathize  is  sometimes  like  shooting  at  a  target  you 
cannot see, we can still investigate the target to see if we 
did in fact hit it. This reply is inadequate. When Mason’s 
father tells him that he feels respect, what Mason learns 
about  his  father  is  similar  to  what  the  Prime  Minister 
knows about the skid row residents. She knows that their 
feelings  fall  under  the  general  category  of 
disappointment;  similarly,  Mason learns that his father’s 
feelings fall under the general category of respect. Neither 
knows,  solely  on  that  basis,  the  specific  quality  of  the 
others’ felt experiences. The objection is that being told 
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that someone’s feelings are of a certain general sort can 
help one know their specific felt quality. Of course, once 
Mason’s father tells him that he feels respect, not disdain. 
Mason can attempt to imaginatively project himself in his 
father’s state of mind and thereby feel as his father does. 
Now,  he  can  only  correctly  infer  that  the  feelings  he 
experiences are  the  same as his  father’s  feelings if  he 
correctly assumes that his imaginatively projected self is 
similar in feeling to his father. However, if his father has 
given him sufficient indication of why he feels respect for 
Roskolnikov, Mason may know that his imagined self and 
his father share a relevantly similarity  of  feeling. Or he 
may  not.  He  may  fail  in  this  attempt  to  imaginatively 
project  himself  in  his  father’s  state  of  mind.  It  takes 
considerable  imaginative  ability  to  succeed  in  such  a 
project;  nonetheless,  on occasion,  our  imaginations  can 
release us from our cages.
IV. EMPATHY AND COMPASSION
When we succeed in empathizing, understanding and 
tolerance may result. Consider a simple example. Brianna 
is an experienced and accomplished public speaker; Brian, 
on the other hand, has to give the first public presentation 
of his life. Initially, Brianna is irritated at Brian’s constant 
agonizing over the presentation; she thinks he should, at 
his age, be able to pull himself together instead of boiling 
over  with  anxiety.  Eventually,  however,  Brianna 
remembers  what  it  was  like  for  her  before  her  first 
presentation. Imaginatively projecting herself into Brian’s 
state of mind makes Brianna not only tolerant, but even 
solicitous and supportive.
Two  further  points  bear  emphasis.  The  first  is  that 
tolerance  is  important.  Despite  its  obviousness,  the 
importance  of  tolerance  bears  emphasis.  Our 
disagreements  are all  too  often sharp and fundamental 
and equally  too  resistant  to rational  resolution.  As  John 
Rawls notes:
[L]ong  historical  experience  suggests,  and  many  plausible 
reflections  confirm,  that . . .  reasoned  and  uncoerced 
agreement  are  not  to  be  expected. . . .  Our  individual  and 
associative  points  of  view,  intellectual  affinities  and affective 
attachments,  are too diverse,  especially in a free democratic 
society,  to  allow  of  lasting  and  reasoned  agreement.  Many 
conceptions  of  the  world  can  plausibly  be  constructed  from 
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different standpoints. Diversity naturally arises from our limited 
powers  and  distinct  perspectives;  it  is  unrealistic  to  suppose 
that  all  our  differences  are  rooted  solely  in  ignorance  and 
perversity, or else in the rivalries that result from scarcity. . . . 
[The appropriate view of  social  organization]  takes  deep and 
unresolvable differences on matters of fundamental significance 
as a permanent condition of human life.7
Tolerance of differences in “associative points of view, 
intellectual affinities and affective attachments” serve to 
prevent “deep and unresolvable differences on matters of 
fundamental  significance”  from  unacceptably  disrupting 
social and political life.
The second point: we often fail  to empathize, which 
can lead to intolerance. Consider the following variant of 
the Brianna/Brian example. Brianna hardly knows her new 
co-worker,  Brian,  and  his  obvious  anxiety  over  his 
upcoming public presentation annoys her. If she were that 
anxious,  it  would  be  the  outward  manifestation  of  a 
complete  emotional  meltdown,  and she  cannot  tolerate 
such a weak co-worker. Eventually, however, she realizes 
that she hardly knows Brian and that his anxiousness may 
not mean in his case what it would mean in hers. To avoid 
condemning him on inadequate evidence, Brianna decides 
to  tolerate  Brian and even help  him.  Where “deep and 
unresolvable  differences  on  matters  of  fundamental 
significance”  are  the  rule,  and  genuine  empathy  is  a 
difficult achievement, tolerance based on the recognition 
that we have failed to empathize is critical. It is, of course, 
utopian to expect this. It should happen, but it will  not. 
People  too  often  adhere  too  passionately  to  their  own 
“associative  points  of  view,  intellectual  affinities  and 
affective attachments” to realize, first, that another’s felt 
experience  can  make  that  persons  point  of  view  as 
compelling as their own, and, second, that they may not 
have any clear idea of what the other’s felt experience is 
like.
7
7
. John Rawls,  Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77  J. PHIL. 
515, 542 (1980).
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